
Self-Healing Systems

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Talk Outline

- The vision of Self-Healing Systems
 - The problem and its solution
- Architecture-based self-adaptation
 - Rainbow and Stitch
 - Applications to security
- Some current research directions
 - Run-time diagnosis and fault localization
 - Mixed-initiative systems

The Problem

- An important requirement for modern software-based systems

Maintain high-availability and optimal performance even in the presence of

- changes in environment
- system faults
- attacks
- changes in user needs and context


Websites Fail to Adapt

The screenshot shows an Internet Explorer browser window with the title "Walmart.com - Please Accept Our Apology! - Internet Explorer". The address bar displays "http://i.walmart.com/maint/". The main content area features the Walmart logo and a red heading "Walmart.com Scheduled Maintenance". Below the heading, the text reads: "Walmart.com is temporarily unavailable while we make important upgrades to our site. We appreciate your patience and invite you to return soon. If you need immediate assistance, please email us at help@walmart.com or call Customer Service between the hours of 6 a.m. to 1 a.m. CST at 1-800-966-6546." A yellow box on the right side of the page contains the text: "Black Friday, 2006: 'Scheduled Maintenance' on the busiest shopping day?". The Windows taskbar at the bottom shows the date "Friday, November 24, 2006" and the time "7:08 AM".

Amazon.com disrupted due to Xbox 360 the day before

Cost of Downtime

- Average hourly impact of downtime by industry sector



Data from *IT Performance Engineering and Measurement Strategies: Quantifying Performance Loss*, Meta Group, Stamford, CT (October 2000).

How is this addressed today?

- **Technique 1:** Build resilience directly into application code
 - Use exceptions, timeouts, and other low-level programming mechanisms
- Unfortunately, this approach is not good for
 - Locating the cause of a problem
 - Anticipating future problems
 - Detecting “softer” system anomalies
 - Maintainability: hard to add and modify adaptation policies and mechanisms
 - Handling changing objectives
 - Legacy systems: hard to retrofit later

How is this addressed today?

- **Technique 2: Human oversight**
 - Operators, system administrators, users
 - Global oversight, intelligent response
- Unfortunately, this approach is
 - Costly
 - Error-prone

Cost of Human Oversight

- Estimated 1/3-1/2 total IT budget to prevent or recover from crash
- “For every dollar to purchase storage, you spend \$9 to have someone manage it”— Nick Tabellion
- Administrative cost: 60-75% overall cost of database ownership
- 40% of root causes of computer system outage is attributable to operator error

-
- Washington Post, October 17 article: *“Stop worrying about mastermind hackers. Start worrying about the IT guy.”*


“the weakest link often involves the inherent fallibility of humans. ... even the most skilled system administrators struggle to keep every computer at large institutions running smoothly, with the proper software updates, security patches and configurations.”

A New Approach


- Goal: systems automatically and optimally adapt to handle
 - faults and attacks
 - variable resources
 - changes in user needs

But how?


Answer: Move from open-loop to closed-loop systems



IBM MAPE-K



Example: Google File System




Source: “The Google File System” Sanjay Ghemawat, Howard Gobioff, and Shun-Tak Leung. SOSP 2003.

Figure 1: GFS Architecture

The Challenge

- Provide effective engineering support for making systems self-adaptive
 - Applicable to legacy systems
 - Low development cost
 - Domain-specific adaptations
 - Multiple quality dimensions
 - Easily change/augment adaptation policies and mechanisms
 - Reason about the effects of self-adaptation actions and strategies


Related Disciplines




Rainbow Approach

- A framework that
 - Allows one to add a **control layer** to existing systems
 - Uses **architecture models** to detect problems and reason about repair
 - Can be **tailored to specific domains**
 - Separates concerns through **multiple extension points**: probes, actuators, models, fault detection, repair
- The framework is instantiated for specific domains, systems, mechanisms, and policies


Rainbow




Rainbow




Self-Adaptation Example: *Znn.com*



Self-Adaptation Example: *Znn.com*



Znn.com: Rainbow Customizations




Model Manager	MM
Architecture Evaluator	AE
Adaptation Manager	AM
Strategy Executor	SX

Rainbow Adaptation Decision Overview

- Selection from a set of adaptation strategies
 - Multiple strategies may be applicable in a particular system context
- Language for expressing strategies as a decision tree
 - Conditions: determine which branches are applicable
 - Actions: **tactics** that modify the system
- Tree is annotated with properties that
 - Permit selection of strategy with highest utility
 - Support formal reasoning about **time, uncertainty cost and benefit**

Stitch: A Language for Specifying Self-Adaptation Strategies

- **Control-system model:** Selection of next action in a strategy depends on observed effects of previous action
- **Uncertainty:** Probability of taking branch captures non-determinism in choice of action
- **Asynchrony:** Explicit timing delays to see impact
- **Value system:** Utility-based selection of best strategy allows context-sensitive adaptation



Strategy Selection

- Given:
 - Quality dimensions and weights (e.g., 4)
 - A strategy with
 - N nodes
 - Branch probabilities as shown
 - Tactic cost-benefit attributes

$$\begin{aligned}
 &U_{latency}(), U_{quality}(), U_{cost}(), U_{disruption}() \\
 &(W_{latency}, W_{quality}, W_{cost}, W_{disruption}) \\
 &= (0.5, 0.3, 0.1, 0.1) [= 1]
 \end{aligned}$$

Algorithm


Given tree g with node x and its children c :

$$EAAV(g) = sysAV + AggAV(\text{root}(g))$$

$$AggAV(x) = cbav(x) + \sum_c \text{prob}(x,c) AggAV(c)$$


Score = 0.58

[-125, 1.5, 4.75, 2]
~~**[900, 15, 0.275, 0.8]**~~



- Propagate cost-benefit vectors up the tree, reduced by branch probabilities
- Merge expected vector with current conditions (assume: [1025, 3.5, 0, 0])
- Evaluate quality attributes against utility functions
- Compute weighted sum to get utility **score**


Control run



System Adapts

Data shows that our adaptation approach improves overall system performance

Adaptation run



Latency = 2 secs

Application to Security

- Application-layer Denial of Service Attacks
 - Assume an N-tiered model similar to Znn.com
- Quality objectives

Quality	Description
Performance	Request-response time for legitimate users
Cost	Number of active servers
Maliciousness	Percentage of malicious clients
Annoyance	Disruptive side-effects of tactics

Tactics

Tactic	Description
Add capacity	Activate additional servers to distribute the workload
Blackhole	Blacklist clients; requests are dropped
Reduce service	Reduce content fidelity level (e.g., text vs. images)
Throttle	Limit the rate of requests Accepted by the system
Captcha	Forward requests to Captcha processor to verify that the requester is human
Reauthenticate	Force clients to reauthenticate


Strategies

Strategy	Description
Outgun/Absorb	Combines Add capacity and Reduce service
Eliminate	Combines Blackholing and Throttling
Challenge	Combines Captcha and Reauthenticate

Tactics and Strategies

```
1 tactic addCaptcha () {
2   condition (exists lb:D.ZNewsLBT in M.components | lb.captchaEnabled;)
3   action {
4     set lbs = (select l : D.ZNewsLBT in M.components | l.captchaEnable == true)
5     for (D.ZNewsLBT l : lbs) {
6       M.setCaptchaEnabled (l, true);
7     }
8   }
9   effect (forall lb:D.ZNewsLBT in M.components | lb.captchaEnabled;)
10 }
```


```
1 strategy Challenge [unhandledMalicious || unhandledSuspicious] {
2   t0: (cNotChallenging) -> addCaptcha () @[5000] {
3     t0a: (success) -> done;
4     t0b: (default) -> fail;
5   }
6   t1: (lcNotChallenging) -> forceReauthentication () @[5000] {
7     t1a: (success) -> done;
8     t1b: (default) -> fail;
9   }
10 }
```



Results

- Different security strategies are picked in different contexts
 - Not hardwired into the system
- Allows combinations of security repair tactics
 - Can create many strategies from the same tactics
- Supports formal reasoning and model checking
 - We use the PRISM probabilistic model checker to determine analyze strategies
- Allows future addition of security strategies as new mechanisms become available

Some Additional Self-healing System Technical Challenges



1. Diagnosis and localization

2. Humans in the Loop

3. Combining Reactive and Deliberative Adaptation


4. Architecting for Adaptability

5. Proactivity

6. Systems of systems

Fault Diagnosis and Localization


- Successful adaptation requires detecting when there is a problem and locating the source of it
- This is a hard problem because:
 - Many possible causes for an observed problem
 - We have incomplete knowledge of the system
 - Many concurrent execution threads
 - Problems may be intermittent
 - May involve combinations
 - Must be done in real time



Approach



Five step pipeline:

1. Detect *transactions* that map interleaved, concurrent system events to distinct paths in the system
2. Determine whether transactions are successful
3. Create a set of transactions that can be used for analysis
4. Use spectrum-based multiple fault localization to diagnose problems
5. Pass this information to consumers for further action





Example

- Web-based system using multiple servers and dispatchers to serve clients
- Multiple concurrent communication threads




Transaction Families

- **Transaction families** define a parameterized pattern of behaviors
 - Light-weight specification of behavior
 - Define the finite executions
 - Criteria for success/failure




Detecting Transactions




- Map system events to architecture observations
 - Adapt work from dynamic architecture reconstruction* to map events and monitor transaction family instances
- Determine whether the transaction passes or fails
 - Success criteria defined with transaction family

*Schmerl, et al. *Discovering Architectures from Running Systems*. IEEE TOSE 32(7), 2006.

Evaluating Transactions




Evaluating Transactions



...and so on

Localization

- Use a technique called “Spectrum-based Fault Localization”



Txn	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Pass
T1	█	░	░	█	░	░	█	░	█	░	✓
T2	░	█	░	░	█	░	█	░	█	░	✗
T3	░	█	░	░	█	░	█	░	░	█	✓
T4	█	░	█	░	░	█	░	░	░	█	✓
T5	░	█	░	█	░	█	░	█	░	█	✗
...
Tn	█	░	░	░	█	░	█	░	█	█	✗

Samsung Case Study

- Funded by Samsung
- Study diagnosis for Manufacturing Control Systems
 - Stringent requirements for up-time
- Key challenge is scalability and performance
 - High volume of monitored events
 - Many components
 - Must diagnose problem quickly
- Successful demonstration
 - Simulated system
 - Can handle thousands of events and find real failures


Target System

- Large scale industrial system for manufacturing of semiconductors.
 - System controls wafer manufacture, deciding which systems are used to process what.
 - System is divided into multiple components exchanging messages over an event bus.
- Typical failures
 - Messages are lost (or not sent at all)
 - Messages are sent too late
 - Unexpected messages are sent
 - Database performance slowdowns, affecting overall system performance


Samsung Challenges

- Why is it difficult to diagnose failures in this system?
 - Protocols work correctly most of the time.
 - Problems are serious but are rare: a lot needs to be monitored to see a failure happening.
 - Given the sheer volume of data (~2000 messages / second) it is not possible for human operators to identify problems in time.
 - The complexity of the system makes it difficult for developers to figure out where the bugs are.

Simulated System



The TKIN Protocol




Results

- Can handle high volume in real time
 - Thousands of events
- Diagnosis time is low
 - Under 20 seconds for all classes of failure modeled
- Accuracy is high
 - Rankings consistent with actual fault

Some Additional Self-healing System Technical Challenges

1. Diagnosis and localization



2. Humans in the Loop

3. Combining Reactive and Deliberative Adaptation


4. Architecting for Adaptability

5. Proactivity

6. Systems of systems

Mixed Initiative Adaptation

- Mixed initiative requires humans and automated systems to collaborate
- Humans may be involved in different ways



Challenges for Human “Actuation”

- Different humans have different capabilities, permissions, roles, and mental states
 - Varying human attention and readiness to be involved
- The same effect may be accomplished with an automatic mechanism
 - Time-scale differences
 - Effectiveness differences
- Implies the need for a way to determine when to involve the user


Model for Human Involvement

- **Opportunity-Willingness-Capability Model (OWC)***
 - Inspiration from human-cyber design
- **Opportunity:**
 - Is the human in a position to carry out an action
 - E.g., Physically located on site? Access to the room? Has permissions?
- **Capability:**
 - How likely the human is to succeed at the task
 - E.g., level of training, seniority, experience.
- **Willingness:**
 - How likely the human is to do the task if asked
 - E.g., level of attention, stress, incentives

*Eskins, Sanders: The Multiple-Asymmetric-Utility System Model: A Framework for Modeling Cyber-Human Systems.

Integration with Rainbow

- Some tactics are enacted by humans
- **Opportunity** is captured in strategy conditions
- **Willingness** and **Capability** affect probabilities
- **Timing** captured by delay -- human tactics usually have longer delays than automated execution
- Normal strategy evaluation and execution can then be used



Some Additional Self-healing System Technical Challenges

1. Diagnosis and localization
2. Humans in the Loop
3. Combining Reactive and Deliberative Adaptation
4. Architecting for Adaptability
5. Proactivity
6. Systems of systems
7. ... and many others

Other Self-healing System Technical Challenges

1. Diagnosis and localization
2. Uncertainty
3. Combining Reactive and Deliberative Adaptation
4. Humans in the Loop
5. Architecting for Adaptability
6. Proactivity
7. Concurrency, preemption, synchronization
8. Self-healing systems of systems

Conclusion

- Today's systems must adapt to meet dynamically changing environments, failures, attacks, requirements
- **Architecture models** and an **adaptation language** can be combined for effective self-adaption
- **Rainbow**
 - integrates architecture model and a language for self-adaptation
 - provides software engineers the ability to add and evolve self-adaptation capabilities
- Self-adaptation is an active area of research with many challenges, but huge potential to impact our design of systems

References

■ Rainbow

- "Software Architecture-Based Self-Adaptation," David Garlan, Bradley Schmerl and Shang-Wen Cheng. *Autonomic Computing and Networking*, ISBN 978-0-387-89827-8, Springer, 2009.
- "Increasing System Dependability through Architecture-based Self-repair." Garlan, Cheng & Schmerl. *Architecting Dependable Systems*, Springer-Verlag, 2003.
- "Rainbow: Architecture-Based Self Adaptation with Reusable Infrastructure." D. Garlan, et al. *IEEE Computer*, Vol. 37(10), October 2004.
- "Stitch: A Language for Architecture-Based Self-Adaptation." S.W. Cheng and D. Garlan. *Journal of Systems and Software*, Vol. 85(12), December 2012.

■ Diagnosis

- “Architecture-based Run-time Fault Diagnosis,” Paulo Casanova, Bradley Schmerl, David Garlan and Rui Abreu. *Proc. of the 5th European Conference on Software Architecture, Sept 2011.*

■ Proactivity

- Stochastic Game Analysis and Latency Awareness for Proactive Self-Adaptation. J. Cámara, G. A. Moreno & David Garlan. In *Proc. of the 9th Intl Conf. on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems (SEAMS)*, June 2014.

■ Security

- “Architecture-Based Self-Protection: Composing and Reasoning about Denial-of-Service Mitigations.” Schmerl, et al. In *Proc. of HotSoS 2014: 2014 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security*, April 2014.

The End

Supplementary Slides

